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I.  Introduction: The Aging Revolution 
When lawyers outside the United States think of (and write about) new develop-
ments in private international law in the United States, they usually think of the 
choice-of-law revolution with its new theories and new approaches. They think of 
Walter Wheeler Cook’s local law theory with its counter-intuitive idea that judges, 
when they proclaim to apply foreign law, in reality create local law specifically 
catered to the case with its interstate or international implications.1 They think of 
the full-blown attack on traditional private international law by Brainerd Currie’s 
interest analysis, which asks for the court to explicitly address the policies under-
lying specific substantive law rules from different legal systems and the question of 
how to deal with potential true conflicts among those rules.2 They think of David 
Cavers’s attack on what he called system-selecting choice-of-law rules and his 
preference for rule-selecting approaches that do not designate the applicable 
contract law in general but instead determine the applicable law rule by rule, even 
                                                          
∗ Professor, Duke University School of Law; Fellow and Visiting Professor 2009/10, 
Program in Law and Public Affairs, Princeton University. Much of this article, especially in 
Sections I and III, draws on ongoing work with Karen Knop and Annelise Riles, including 
K. KNOP, R. MICHAELS & A. RILES (eds.), ‘Transdisciplinary Conflicts of Law’, in: Law & 
Contemp. Probs. 71/3 (Summer 2008). 
1 W.W. COOK, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (1942). 
2 B. CURRIE, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws (1963). 
Ralf Michaels 
 
 
Yearbook of Private International Law, Volume 11 (2009) 12 
issue by issue.3 They think of William Baxter’s idea of comparative impairment,4 
of Ehrenzweig’s lex fori theory,5 of Leflar’s ‘better law theory,’6 and of von 
Mehren’s and Donald Trautman’s functionalism.7  
In other words, the new developments they think of are old news. The U.S. 
conflicts revolution has aged, and it has not aged well. The foundations for the 
revolution were formulated in the 1920s and 1930s; the most important theoretical 
texts and judicial decisions stem from the 1950s and 1960s. The Second Restate-
ment of Conflict of Laws dates from 1971 and is thus older than the vast majority 
of conflicts codifications worldwide. The most famous case – Babcock v. Jackson,8 
which overcame the strict territoriality principle for the law of torts – is almost 50 
years old. Its holding, the application of the law of the parties’ common domicile to 
liability for an accident suffered elsewhere, is now, from a comparative law per-
spective, unexciting.9 Tellingly, in his authoritative recent book on the past, 
present, and future of the revolution, Symeon Symeonides confines the chapter on 
‘the scholastic revolution’10 to ‘the writings of the most influential members of the 
revolution’s first generation, all but three of whom are now deceased.’11 
Even more discomfiting, however, is Prof. Symeonides’ subsequent list of 
‘[t]he next generation, the present. ‘, [...]a diverse and prolific group that includes 
revolutionaries, counter-revolutionaries, and reformers,’ because most of the arti-
cles for which he cites this group were written decades ago, too. Even if a number 
of more recent publications, by these and other authors, could be added,12 the 
                                                          
3 D. CAVERS, The Choice-of-Law Process (1965); id., The Choice of Law: Selected 
Essays 1933-1983 (1985). 
4 W. F. BAXTER, ‘Choice of Law and the Federal System’, in: 16 Stan. L. Rev. 1 
(1963). 
5 A. A. EHRENZWEIG, ‘The Lex Fori -Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws’, in: 58 
Mich. L. Rev. 637 (1960). 
6 R. B. LEFLAR, ‘Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law’, in: 41 NYU 
L. Rev. 367 (1966); id., ‘More on Choice Influencing Considerations’, in: 54 Cal. L. Rev. 
1584 (1966). 
7 A. T. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, The Law of Multistate Problems (1965). 
8 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963); republished, e.g., in H. SCHACK, Höchstrichterliche 
Rechtsprechung zum Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrecht (2d ed. 2000) case no. 21, 
p. 89, where all other published decisions (except for two other non-German decisions) are 
more recent. 
9 K. SIEHR, ‘Revolution and Evolution in Conflicts Law’, in: 60 La. L. Rev. 1353 
(2000). 
10 S. C. SYMEONIDES, The American Choice-of-Law Revolution: Past, Present and 
Future (2006) 9-35. The book is a revised version of S. C. SYMEONIDES, The American 
Choice-of-Law Revolution in the Courts: Today and Tomorrow, 298 Rec. des cours 1 
(2003). 
11 Id. at 9, n. 5. 
12 For recent bibliographies, see S. C. SYMEONIDES, ‘Conflict of Laws Bibliography: 
U.S. Sources, 2005-2006’, in: 54 Am. J. Comp. L. 789 (2006); id., ‘Private International Law 
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general gist seems clear: some fifty years after the revolution, the intellectual 
excitement that once defined U.S. scholarship has largely petered out.13 One gets 
the feeling that the revolution has run out of steam; it is merely being administered. 
At the same time, the opposition to the revolution has lost interest, apparently 
unable to present viable alternatives. 
A similar picture emerges from case law. Symeonides’ annual surveys of 
conflict-of-laws decisions in U.S. courts, published in the American Journal of 
Comparative Law,14 have long ceased to report big methodological developments, 
largely because there are none. This would not be a reason for despair if courts’ 
decisions still provided valuable insights, or at least some continuity could be 
discovered, but neither really is the case. What we observe could be called, 
euphemistically, pragmatism in the solution of conflict-of-laws problems: all 
available methods can be used to justify all desirable (and undesirable) outcomes, 
so the best approach is to downplay the importance of method altogether and 
instead resolve cases on the basis of what seems right. Less euphemistically, this 
could be called muddling through – making necessary decisions without a clear 
theoretical framework of why they should come out this way rather than another. 
It is remarkable how much the crisis of conflict of laws is a particularly US-
American, or perhaps North American,15 matter. Elsewhere in the world, conflict of 
laws is thriving. Europe is perhaps the most obvious example. Some scholars have 
suggested that the difference is due to the European preference for evolution, a 
slow, gradual development of conflicts thinking, over revolution.16 Others, less 
generously, think that Europeans are still caught in naïve faith in the power of 
formal doctrine. By contrast, I have argued that these developments amount to a 
veritable choice-of-law revolution, European style.17 Developments in Europe, both 
legislative and in the case law of the Court of Justice, replace the traditional 
conflict of laws paradigm with one based on the federalization and 
                                                                                                                                      
Bibliography 2007-08: U.S. and Foreign Sources in English’, in: 57 Am. J. Comp. L. 331-
346 (2009). 
13 K. KNOP, R. MICHAELS & A. RILES, ‘Foreword: Transdisciplinary Conflicts of 
Law’, in: K. KNOP et al. (note *) 1, 3. 
14 Most recently S. C. SYMEONIDES, ‘Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2009: 
Twenty-Third Annual Survey’, in: 58 Am. J. Comp. L. 227 (2010) with references for earlier 
reports. These reports are also available at <http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/journals/wlo/ 
conflicts>. 
15 For Canada, see the references in K. KNOP, R. MICHAELS & A. RILES (note 13) 2-3. 
16 E.g. J. VON HEIN, ‘Something Old and Something Borrowed, but Nothing New? 
Rome II and the European Choice-of-Law Evolution’, in: 82 Tul. L. Rev. 1663 (2008); D. 
SOLOMON, ‘The Private International Law of Contracts in Europe: Advances and Retreats’, 
in: 82 Tul. L. Rev. 1709 (2008); S. C. SYMEONIDES, ‘The American Revolution and the 
European Evolution in Choice of Law: Reciprocal Lessons’, in: 82 Tul. L. Rev. 1741-91 
(2008). 
17 R. MICHAELS, ‘Die europäische IPR-Revolution: Regulierung, Europäisierung, 
Mediatisierung’, in: Festschrift J. Kropholler (2008), 151-173; English version as ‘The New 
European Choice-of-Law Revolution’, in: 82 Tul. L. Rev. 1607-1644 (2008). 
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constitutionalization of private international law, and by a plurality of methods: 
different methods apply to conflicts between laws of the member states and 
conflicts with the law of third countries; classical conflict of laws and new regula-
tory conflict of laws methods stand in productive conflict with each other. 
In some ways, the European revolution is in even more radical than the 
American one, because it has achieved goals that the U.S. revolution missed, 
notably the federalization and constitutionalization of choice of law.18 The U.S. 
revolution, by contrast, led to a dead end, perhaps because it did not go far enough 
in two aspects central to early realist critiques: politics and theory. The revolution 
discarded old doctrinal instruments of conflicts – characterization, renvoi, 
preliminary questions – as mere formalism, fig leaves concealing the politics at 
stake, the social goals aimed at. A new theory of law emphasized law’s relation to 
social ends. The plea to formalize these social goals was incorporated in 
governmental interest analysis, which essentially views every law as the embodi-
ment of some governmental policy. But  in application, governmental interests 
were depoliticized and detheorized: To be manageable, these interests had to be 
stripped of their political and social content and treated as mere preferences, data.19 
The antiformalism of the revolution spurred a method that spawned a new 
formalism. 
Is there a chance for a revival? There has been talk, most recently at a big 
conference at New York University in the spring of 2009, of a new Restatement of 
Conflict of Laws, to replace the Restatement Second, which is forty years old and 
has been controversial from the start.20 At present, support for such a project does 
not seem great. The main counterargument against such a Restatement – that the 
field is in such disarray that there is nothing to restate – seems overstated: debates 
over a new Restatement might very well spur the necessary broader discussions, as 
did discussions over earlier Restatements. The big problem is not virulent 
disagreement but rather uniform disenchantment: the inability in the field to even 
discuss issues of politics and theory makes it hard to see how the necessary 
excitement could be spurred that would be needed for such a broader discussion. 
There is little hope for such excitement in the core of the discipline – espe-
cially choice of law for tort and contract – because, it seems, everything that could 
be said (and more) has already been said; ‘everything worthy of trying has been 
                                                          
18 Ibid. at 1643. 
19 Cf. A. RILES, ‘A New Agenda for the Cultural Study of Law: Taking on the 
Technicalities’, in: 53 Buff. L. Rev. 973 (2005), 1018-21. 
20 ‘Symposium: The Silver Anniversary of the Second Conflicts Restatement’, in: 56 
Maryland L. Rev. 1193 (1997); ‘Symposium: Preparing for the Next Century – A New 
Restatement of Conflicts’, in: 75 Indiana L. J. 399-686 (2000); S.C. SYMEONIDES, ‘A New 
Conflicts Restatement: Why Not?’, in: 5 J. Pr. Int. L. 383-424 (2009); see also M. 
TRAYNOR, ‘The First Restatements and the Vision of the American Law Institute, Then and 
Now’, in: 32 So. Ill. U. L. J. 145 (2007). 
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tried before, under the same or other labels.’21 However, not all is lost. There are in 
fact exciting developments in conflict of laws, but they are taking place at the 
fringes and not in the center. Politics is an issue for the most hotly debated topic in 
conflict of laws at the moment, same-sex marriage, and many scholars of marriage 
law or gender studies have become interested in conflict of laws. Theory is an issue 
for interdisciplinary interest in conflict of laws from the perspective of other disci-
plines – economics, political science, anthropology. What some of the participants 
in these debates lack in specific conflict of laws expertise, they make up for by 
bringing new perspectives into an intradisciplinary debate that has long been 
chasing its own tail. In the next two sections I discuss these developments in turn, 
and analyze what they could mean for a broader revival of U.S. conflict of laws, 
before addressing, briefly, the implications for a new Restatement. 
 
 
 
II.  The Return of Politics: Same-Sex Marriage 
The focus of the choice-of-law revolution and of most debates on method had been 
on contract and torts. Both of these areas have consolidated – contracts especially 
through the acceptance of party autonomy, tort law through what may be loosely 
described as a presumption for lex loci with an exception for common domicile 
cases. The most important developments today happen outside the law of obli-
gations, first among them the question of same-sex marriage. 
Same-sex marriage is currently one of the most disputed political topics 
generally, and the country remains deeply divided over the issue. The first state to 
legalize same-sex marriage was Massachusetts, where a 2003 court decision 
declared the ban on same-sex marriage to be a violation of the state constitution.22 
Since 2008, developments have accelerated tremendously. On the one hand, courts 
in California,23 Connecticut24 and Iowa25 have rendered decisions under their own 
states’ constitutions by and large similar to the one in Massachusetts. Legislators in 
Vermont,26 Maine27 and New Hampshire28 and the District of Columbia29 took 
                                                          
21 K. H. NADELMANN, ‘Marginal Remarks on the New Trends in American Conflicts 
Law’, in: 28 Law & Contemp. Probs. 860 (Autumn 1963), cited in F. K. JUENGER, Choice of 
Law and Multistate Justice 6 (1993). 
22 Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. 
2003). 
23 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Sup. Ct. Cal. 2008). 
24 Kerrigan v. Commr. of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Sup. Ct. Conn. 2008). 
25 Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, (Sup. Ct. Iowa 2009). 
26 15 Vermont Statutes Annotated § 8, as amended by 2009 Vermont Laws No. 3 (S. 
115). 
27 An Act To End Discrimination in Civil Marriage and Affirm Religious Freedom, 
2009 Maine Legislative Service Ch. 82 (S.P. 384) (L.D. 1020). The Act explicitly also 
granted recognition to same-sex marriage celebrated elsewhere. 
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similar steps through the legislative process. On the other hand, opposition against 
these movements is strong. Referenda have overturned the decisions in California30 
and in Maine;31 the New York State and New Jersey Senates have each rejected 
proposals to legalize same-sex marriage in domestic law in the last half year.32 
Furthermore, some thirty states explicitly reject same-sex marriage in either statute 
or their constitution. Thus, although one may expect some more states to recognize 
same-sex marriage in the future, chances are that differences among states will 
remain. 
Although much of the debate on same-sex marriage concerns substantive 
law, the topic has also spurred significant conflict of laws debates.33 That alone is 
not surprising, given the differences between state laws, the lack of uniform federal 
law that would trump such law, and the frequency with which Americans, 
including same-sex couples, travel across state boundaries. More surprising 
perhaps is how much the interest groups themselves – supporters of same-sex 
marriage on the one hand, defenders of exclusive classical marriage on the other – 
are focusing not just on substantive law but strongly on conflict of laws. Indeed, 
both sides have stakes in conflict of laws. Mutual recognition among states would 
make it unnecessary to change laws in every state to allow for same-sex marriage – 
same-sex partners could travel to get married in Massachusetts and subsequently 
have their marriage recognized in their home states. (Under most choice-of-laws 
approaches the lex celebrationis governs the validity of marriage.) 
What is fascinating in the debate is how politics reenters the conflict of laws 
discussion. In Europe, politics became a part of conflict-of-laws discussions once 
European choice of law became federalized (or Europeanized) and 
                                                                                                                                      
28 New Hampshire Revised Statutes § 457:1-a. 
29 D.C. Code § 46-401.01, as amended by the Religious Freedom and Civil Marriage 
Equality Amendment Act of 2009, L18-110, effective March 3, 2010 
30 Proposition 8 (2008) added sec. 7.5 to Art. 1 of the State Constitution: ‘Only mar-
riage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.’ The amendment was 
held compatible with the California Constitution in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Sup Ct. 
Cal. 2009), The court ruled, however, that the approximately 18,000 same-sex marriages 
that took place in 2008 would remain valid. Ibid. at 119 ff. For the impact on marriages 
celebrated elsewhere, see infra, text after note 42. A challenge in federal court is pending as 
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, where the challengers are represented by former U.S. Solicitor 
General (in the Bush administration) Theodore Olson and David Boies, famous lawyers who 
had been on opposite sides in Bush v. Gore, the US Supreme Court decision that decided the 
presidential election in 2000. 
31 19-A Maine Revised Statutes Annotated § 650. 
32 New York State Senate Votes Down Gay Marriage Bill, New York Times, 3 
December 2009, p. A1; New Jersey Senate Defeats Gay Marriage Bill, New York Times, 8 
January 2010, p. A18. 
33 The most comprehensive analysis is A. KOPPELMAN, Same Sex, Different States. 
When Same-Sex Marriages Cross State Lines, Yale Univ. Press 2006; an excellent brief 
survey is P. HAY, ‘Recognition of Same-Sex Legal Relationships in the United States’, in: 
54 Am. J. Comp. L. 257 (2006). 
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constitutionalized (especially in the ECJ jurisprudence on the fundamental 
freedoms).34 The U.S. conflict-of-laws revolution had stopped short of 
federalization and constitutionalization, against the wishes of many of its propo-
nents. Now, some of this is taking place, at the least in same-sex marriage debate, 
putting politics back into the debate. Let me address each of these developments in 
turn. 
 
 
A.  Constitutionalization 
The most intensive discussion concerns the U.S. Constitution and the question 
whether it requires states to recognize marriages celebrated elsewhere. The basis 
for this argument is Full Faith and Credit Clause (Art. IV Sec. 1) of the U.S. Con-
stitution: 
‘Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, 
records, and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the 
Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such 
acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect 
thereof’. 
The first sentence could require states to recognize marriages celebrated elsewhere 
if two conditions are met – that ‘full faith and credit’ announces a duty to recog-
nize, and that marriage celebrations qualify as ‘public acts’ in the sense of the 
Constitution. Historically, the provision was understood to relate merely to eviden-
tiary force of state acts; what exact effects were to be given to acts of other states 
would have been left to Congress, as the second clause of the provision suggests.35 
Today, the clause has different relevance for choice of law and for judgments: As 
regards judgments, it is understood to require states to recognize each other’s court 
decisions (with few limitations). As regards choice of law, by contrast, the clause 
has almost no impact under Supreme Court law.36 Traditionally, the clause was 
read not to preclude states from denying recognition for marriages celebrated else-
where, but recent scholarship has drawn this interpretation into question.).37 Lower 
                                                          
34 R. MICHAELS (note 17). 
35 Most recently, D.E. ENGDAHL, ‘The Classic Rule of Faith and Credit’, in: 118 Yale 
L.J. 1584 (2009); S. E. SACHS, ‘Full Faith and Credit in the Early Congress’, in: 95 Va. L. 
Rev. 1201 (2009), both with further references. 
36 Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981); Sun Oil v. Wortman, 486 
U.S. 717 (1988); Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488 (2003). The 
current interpretation of the clause is summarized in R. U. WHITTEN, ‘Full Faith and Credit 
for Dummies’, in: 38 Creighton L. Rev. 465 (2005). 
37 E.g. L. KRAMER, ‘Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional 
Public Policy Exception’, in: 106 Yale L.J. 1965 (1997); cf. R. U. WHITTEN, ‘The Original 
Understanding of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Defense of Marriage Act’, in: 32 
Creighton L. Rev. 255 (1998); S. E. COX, ‘Nine Questions About Same-Sex Marriage Con-
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courts faced with the question have so far denied a duty for states to recognize 
same-sex marriages celebrated abroad, at least for their own domiciliaries.38 By 
contrast, recognition of marriage celebrated in foreign countries, e.g. in Canada, is 
not a matter for the full faith and credit clause, so there is little doubt that the 
public policy exception is available,39 although of course states remain free to 
recognize foreign-nation marriages, too.40 
 
 
B.  Federalization 
The Constitutional issues have spurred a rarity in conflict of laws: federal legisla-
tion. Unlike most other conflict-of-laws issues that are left to the states, the recog-
nition of same-sex marriages is an issue that has for some time engaged the federal 
legislator. One reason is that substantive family law is largely a matter for state 
law; the federal legislator can only define marriage insofar as it concerns federal 
law. By contrast, interstate recognition of laws, judgments, and other public acts is 
a matter available to the U.S. Congress under the Full Faith and Credit clause of 
the U.S. Constitution, as are federal questions. 
Traditionally, the definition of marriage was left to the states; whether mar-
riages celebrated elsewhere could be recognized was a conflict-of-laws issue 
largely determined by courts. Now, with all the attention, the question has become 
more complicated. In response to the acceptance of same-sex marriage in Massa-
chusetts, several states have adopted either legislation or constitutional amend-
ments explicitly refusing the recognition of same-sex marriages celebrated else-
where. In other states that recognize domestic same-sex marriages, the decision has 
been made to also recognize same-sex marriages celebrated elsewhere. Frequently, 
the position on the latter decision is derived directly from the domestic policy: a 
state that refuses same-sex marriage domestically will, for that reason alone, deny 
recognition to marriages celebrated elsewhere.41 For example, in California, mar-
riages celebrated elsewhere before the referendum are recognized under the 
                                                                                                                                      
flicts’, in: 40 New Eng. L. Rev. 361 (2006), 377-84. As a consequence, the Defense of 
Marriage Act, discussed under B., would be unconstitutional. 
38 Wilson v. Ake, 354 F.Supp.2d 1298 (M.D.Fla., 2005). 
39 Hennefeld v. Township of Montclair, 22 N.J.Tax 166 (N.J. Tax 2005); Funder-
burke v. New York State Dep’t of Civ. Servs., 822 N.Y.S.2d 393 (Nassau County Sup. Ct. 
2006) (but see also Funderburke v. State Dept. of Civil Service, 854 N.Y.S.2d 466 (2d Dep’t 
2008)); Lane v. Albanese, 2005 WL 896129 (Conn.Super.,2005). 
40 Martinez v. County of Monroe, 850 N.Y.S.2d 740 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep’t 
2008), leave to appeal dismissed, 889 N.E.2d 496 (2008); see also Godfrey v. DiNapoli, 866 
N.Y.S.2d 844 (New York Sup. Ct. 2008). 
41 E.g. Opinion of the Attorney-General of Connecticut, 2005 WL 2293060 
(Conn.A.G.). 
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Marriage Recognition and Family Protection Act of 2009; marriages celebrated 
later get all legal rights of marriage but not the status.42 
However, in a number of states, differences exist. Although a New York 
Court had declared the ban on same-sex marriage under New York’s own substan-
tive law to be constitutional,43 the decision of a New York county to nonetheless 
recognize same-sex marriages celebrated elsewhere has been upheld.44 Moreover, 
the governor of New York in 2008 directed all state agencies to recognize mar-
riages celebrated validly elsewhere.45 Similarly, the Council for the District of 
Columbia voted to recognize same-sex marriages celebrated elsewhere,46 well 
before it allowed same-sex couples to marry domestically. A Texan court held that 
the constitutional ban on same-sex marriage in Texas violates the federal 
Constitution and thus does not prevent recognition of a same-sex marriage 
celebrated in Massachusetts to provide a jurisdictional basis for divorce 
proceedings.47  
In response to fears that the acceptance of same-sex marriage in individual 
states might effectively bind other states and the federal legislature the U.S. Con-
gress passed, in 1996, the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).48 The act defines, for 
purposes of federal law, marriage as a union between a man and a woman.49 More-
over, it leaves the question of interstate recognition of same-sex marriages and 
civil unions to each individual state.50 This latter part has been much criticized, 
                                                          
42 California 2009 Legislative Service Ch. 625 (S.B. 54), amending Section 308 of 
the Family Code.  
43 Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006); for the fate of a recent legislative 
proposal, see supra n. 33. 
44 Godfrey v. Spano, 13 N.Y.3d 358 (New York Court of Appeals 2009).  
45 Constitutionality of the directive under the New York State Constitution has been 
upheld: directive/executive order has been challenged, and its constitutionality has been 
upheld: Golden v. Paterson, 877 N.Y.S.2d 822 (N.Y.Sup., 2008). For developments in New 
York, see Arthur S. Leonard, ‘New York Recognition of Legal Status for Same-Sex 
Couples: A Rapidly Developing Story’, in: 54 N.Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 479 (2010). 
46 D.C. Code § 46-405.01, as amended by the Jury and Marriage Amendment Act of 
2009, L 18-9 effective July 7, 2009.  
47 In re J.B. (District Court of Texas, 302nd Judicial District. 2009), 2009 WL 
3316580. 
48 Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) (Pub.L. 104-199, Sept. 21, 1996, 110 Stat. 
2419). 
49 I U.S.C. Sec. 7: ‘In determining the meaning of any act of Congress, or of any rul-
ing, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies in the 
United States, the word «marriage» means only a legal union between one man and one 
woman as husband and wife, and the word «spouse» refers only to a person of the opposite 
sex who is a husband or a wife.’ 
50 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1738: ‘No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or 
Indian tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding 
of any other State, territory, possession or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of 
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although it is not clear whether it changes very much, at least as regards the 
recognition of marriages themselves. If, as many think, states are free to decide 
whether to recognize marriages celebrated under the U.S. Constitution, then the 
provision is merely declaratory. If, on the other hand, the Full Faith and Credit 
clause is read to require states to recognize marriages celebrated elsewhere, as 
some argue, then a statute cannot change this and would be unconstitutional and 
therefore invalid.51 The bill’s sponsors’ hope was that states would feel free to 
reject recognition without the need to resort to a strong public policy exception,52 
though it is not clear why this changed much with regard to existing law. A more 
complicated question is whether DOMA can release the states from their duty to 
recognize foreign judgments that recognize same-sex marriages, given that the 
duty to recognize sister-state judgments is considered all but absolute.53  
A 2006 constitutional proposal, the ‘Federal Marriage Amendment,’ later 
called ‘Marriage Protection Amendment’, which failed to reach the necessary 
qualified majority, tried to go further, though its exact meaning was always 
ambiguous.54 Its first sentence suggested a uniform definition of marriage (for 
federal and state law) as a union between a man and a woman; its second sentence, 
by contrast, suggested merely that no Federal or State Constitution should be read 
to require same-sex marriage, apparently leaving it open for the legislature to allow 
it. Although President Bush explicitly justified the proposed amendment with the 
potential effect of decisions in one state on the rest of the country,55 the impact of 
the amendment on the liberty of states to decide whether to recognize marriages 
celebrated elsewhere was not clear.56 
 
                                                                                                                                      
the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, pos-
session, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.’ 
51 Cf. Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 272 n.18 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 
1980): ‘while Congress clearly has the power to increase the measure of full faith and credit 
that a State may accord to the laws or judgments of another State, there is at least some 
question whether Congress may cut back on the measure of faith and credit required by a 
decision of this Court.’ 
52 House Report No. 104–664 at 10-11.  
53 See the discussion in L. D. WARDLE, ‘Non-Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage 
Judgments under DOMA and the Constitution’, in: 38 Creighton L. Rev. 365 (2005). 
54 For details on both legislative history and academic commentary, see Th. B. 
COLBY, ‘The Federal Marriage Amendment and the False Promise of Originalism’, in: 108 
Colum. L. Rev. 529 (2008).  
55 G. W. Bush, President Calls for Constitutional Amendment Protecting Marriage: 
Remarks by the President (Feb. 24, 2004), available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/ 
releases/2004/02/20040224-2.html>. 
56 Cf. W. SINGER, ‘Same Sex Marriage, Full Faith and Credit, and the Evasion of 
Obligation’, in: 1 Stan. Civ. Rts. Civ. Liberties J. 1 (2005) 46 (‘One thing is clear however; 
if adopted, this provision would allow states to refuse to recognize same sex marriages 
validly performed in other jurisdictions.’) with H. WILKINSON III, ‘Gay Rights and American 
Constitutionalism: What’s a Constitution For?’, in: 56 Duke L. J. 545 (2006), 553-57. 
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C.  The Return of Politics 
After all the developments, states remain in all likelihood still largely free to 
determine whether or not to recognize marriages celebrated elsewhere. Nonethe-
less, the federal legislation is by no means irrelevant: it highlights the crucial ele-
ment of federalism in the same-sex marriage debate. Often, federalism discussions 
are confined to the vertical dimension: how much regulatory discretion is left to the 
states vis-à-vis the federal government. In the same-sex marriage context, the hori-
zontal dimension, the relation between states, comes to the fore.57 How can states 
still define what should count as a marriage if parties can simply enter elsewhere 
into a marriage that their home state must then recognize? On the other hand, what 
is the value of same-sex marriage if it loses its effectiveness once the parties cross 
state boundaries? The debate on same-sex marriage reintroduces these big political 
topics into conflict-of-laws debates that had otherwise become detached and 
merely technical, and it reintroduces them in very concrete ways. 
It is important to see the difference between politics in the same-sex mar-
riage debate and in governmental interest analysis. Interest analysis uses political 
preferences of states as data; whether Texas should recognize a marriage cele-
brated in Massachusetts depends on which state cares more about this, not on the 
content of the policies as such. In this vein one can argue that ‘the conflicts issues 
have little to do with the pros and cons of same-sex marriage.’58 But that does not 
seem to grasp the conflicts debate, which appears, on both sides, very much as an 
extension of a substantive law debate. Conflict of laws is seen as a tool to promote 
certain public policies parallel to their promotion in substantive law, and this is 
what gets so many non-conflicts scholars interested in the debate. However, 
conflicts is not merely the continuation of substantive laws by other means. The 
recognition of a marriage that has been validly celebrated, even if elsewhere, is 
obviously quite different from the provision of domestic procedures to get married. 
The challenge for married same-sex couples coming from a change of status once 
they travel among states is quite different from the challenge coming from not 
being able to marry at all. 
Another aspect gives the conflict-of-laws issue a partial autonomy from the 
substantive law debate. Conflict of laws addresses problems and provides tech-
niques that go beyond the pure ‘yes or no’ dichotomy in substantive law. In 
conflict-of-laws decisions, a variety of issues arise beyond the mere recognition of 
a status – intramarital obligations, visiting rights, adoption rights, succession, etc. – 
and the considerations may be different for each one of these.59 Further, it is in the 
conflict-of-laws situation that the subtle differences between the regimes of 
different states that all allow same-sex unions in one way or other play a role, 
                                                          
57 See, most recently, J. RENSBERGER, ‘Interstate Pluralism: The Role of Federalism 
in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate’, in: B.Y.U.L. Rev. 1703 (2008). 
58 S.E. COX (note 39), at 361. 
59 T. WOLFF, ‘Interest Analysis in Interjurisdictional Marriage Disputes’, in: 153 U. 
Penn. L. Rev., 2215-50. (2005). 
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because the foreign status must somehow be made to fit into the domestic legal 
landscape.60 
The potential of conflict of laws is twofold, as the same-sex marriage debate 
demonstrates: First, it brings to the fore the conflict between different conceptions 
as an actual conflict (of laws), not a mere technical question without real political 
relevance. Second, it responds to the conflict in a way catered to the specifics of 
the case, not on an abstract level.61 This potential of conflict of laws as an alterna-
tive site for political debate is not confined to same-sex marriage. For example, 
Karen Knop shows that although we ordinarily think of citizenship as public, pri-
vate international law covers some of the same ground.62 In fact, conflict of laws as 
private citizenship has particular value in a post-9/11 world because its treatment 
of enemy aliens, illegal immigrants, and members of religious immigrant groups 
and other minorities offers us examples of already-existing cosmopolitanism 
within the common law. Rather than deny the political relevance of these contexts, 
then, conflict of laws has a more differentiated way of dealing with them. As 
Marianne Constable points out from the perspective of political theory, conflict of 
laws can be thought of as the discipline that deals with ‘meaningful cross-state 
politics and actions by non-simply-state players.’63 
 
 
 
III.  The Return of Theory: Interdisciplinarity 
Once it is clear (again) that conflict of laws is not ‘merely’ about pure technicali-
ties, the need for a proper theory becomes acute again. Indeed, a second develop-
ment can be seen in new attempts to theorize conflict of laws, in particular from an 
interdisciplinary perspective. In 1987, Richard Posner named ‘the destruction of 
certainty in the field of conflict-of-laws’ as a prime example of the inadequacy of 
lawyerly as opposed to interdisciplinary reform.64 More recently, the general trend 
towards interdisciplinarity has begun to spread to conflict of laws – first from the 
social sciences, more recently also from the humanities and critical theory.65 Some 
                                                          
60 H. Y. LEVIN, ‘Resolving Interstate Conflicts Over Marriage, Marriage-Like, and 
Marriage-Lite Relationships’ (2009), available at <http://works.bepress.com/hillel_levin/>. 
61 See K. KNOP, R. MICHAELS & A. RILES, ‘International Law in Domestic Courts: A 
Conflict of Laws Approach’ (2009) at 10, available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1413189>. 
62 K. KNOP, ‘Citizenship, Public and Private’, in: 71/3 Law & Cont. Probs. 309 
(Summer 2008). 
63 M. CONSTABLE, ‘Afterword: Conflicts as a Law of Laws?’, in: 71/3 Law & 
Contemp. Probs. 343 (Summer 2008). 
64 R. POSNER, ‘The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987’, in: 
Harv. L. Rev. 100 (1987) 761, 769-70; see also his fundamental criticism in Kaczmarek v. 
Allied Chemical Corp., 836 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir. 1987). 
65 See especially Law & Contemp Probs 71/3 (Summer 2008): ‘Transdisciplinary 
Conflicts’ (K. KNOP, R. MICHAELS & A. RILES, special eds.) (note *). 
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of this interdisciplinary work comes from conflict-of-laws scholars who, disap-
pointed by traditional methods, or perhaps in search of new things to say, import 
approaches from outside the law. Some such work comes from scholars from other 
disciplines altogether – economics, political science, anthropology – who view 
conflict of laws as a fruitful field for experimentation. Sometimes, these interdisci-
plinary approaches amount to little more than reformulations of traditional 
approaches in conflict of laws. Sometimes, however, the new perspectives open 
new potential for the discipline.  
 
 
A.  Law and Economics 
The greatest interdisciplinary interest comes from law and economics. For a long 
time, conflict of laws was largely out of sight for economic analysis. More 
recently, however, we have begun to see a small boom in interest, not only in 
academic scholarship,66 but also occasionally in court decisions. One example is 
the decision in Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., where Richard Posner found an 
economic justification for the presumption that lex loci delicti should apply to 
claims in tort law:67 
For that is the place that has the greatest interest in striking a reason-
able balance among safety, cost, and other factors pertinent to the 
design and administration of a system of tort law. Most people 
affected whether as victims or as injurers by accidents and other 
injury-causing events are residents of the jurisdiction in which the 
event takes place. So if law can be assumed to be generally respon-
sive to the values and preferences of the people who live in the 
community that formulated the law, the law of the place of the acci-
dent can be expected to reflect the values and preferences of the peo-
ple most likely to be involved in accidents – can be expected, in 
other words, to be responsive and responsible law, law that internal-
izes the costs and benefits of the people affected by it. 
As a consequence, Mexican tort law was applied, even though the specific case 
concerned only U.S. parties – an Illinois domiciliary as plaintiff, and Sheraton 
Corp., a US-based corporation, as owner of the Hotel in Mexico where the plaintiff 
had suffered an injury. Judge Posner’s argument that Mexico has a regulatory 
                                                          
66 A collection of representative articles (in two volumes) is E. O’HARA (ed.), The 
Economics of Conflict of Laws, Elgar Publishing (2007); a recent survey with a comprehen-
sive bibliography is E. O’HARA & L. E. RIBSTEIN, Conflict of Laws and Choice of Law 
(2009), available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1499311>. 
67 174 F.3d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 1999). Discussed in S. C. SYMEONIDES, ‘Choice of 
Law in the American Courts 1999: One More Year’, in: 48 Am. J. Comp. L. 143, 150-52. 
Judge Posner has reiterated the principle announced in the case frequently, most recently in 
Abad v. Bayer Corp., 563 F.3d 663, 669 (7th Cir. 2009) and in Kamelgard v. Macura, WL 
3400953 at *6 (7th Cir. 2009) (where the principle was not extended to defamation). 
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advantage over accidents happening in Mexico has been challenged in another 
economic analysis by Jack Goldsmith and Alan Sykes.68 They argue that the basis 
for lex loci delicti lies not in regulatory advantage but in principles of antidiscrimi-
nation in trade (and thus in economics-based principles of market competition): If a 
state applied Mexican law to Mexican-owned hotels in Mexico and U.S. law to 
US-owned hotels in Mexico, it would discriminate against the U.S. owner because 
U.S. law is more plaintiff-friendly than Mexican law.69 
Broadly speaking, three different models of law and economics scholarship 
exist in conflict of laws.70 A first model extends ideas from private law, in particu-
lar private ordering and efficiency among individuals, into private international 
law.71 Not surprisingly, given the starting point, there is an emphasis on party 
autonomy; otherwise, choice-of-law rules should either promote private ordering or 
otherwise appear as the result of hypothetical bargaining between individuals.72 A 
second model, based on interest analysis, focuses on regulatory interests among 
states and seeks efficient accommodation of these interests. Most solutions in this 
field end up with a sophisticated version of Baxter’s comparative impairment solu-
tion.73 A third model, finally, takes the theory of regulatory competition as a start-
ing point and assesses the interaction between conflict of laws and domestic law, in 
particular the incentives for states to adapt their substantive laws in view of their 
scope of application.74 
All of these proposals hold potential for conflict of laws. The first two 
models ultimately tend to collapse into substantive law paradigms (of private law 
and international law respectively),75 which means that they challenge conflict of 
laws to take seriously its basis in one or the other substantive law fields, even 
                                                          
68 J. L. GOLDSMITH & A. O. SYKES, ‘Lex loci delictus and global economic welfare: 
Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp.’, in: 120 Harv. L. Rev. (2007) 1137. 
69 More generally on the impact of WTO law on conflict of laws, see M. KRAUS, Die 
Auswirkungen des Welthandelsrechts auf das Internationale Kollisionsrecht (2007).  
70 R. MICHAELS, ‘Economics of Law as Choice of Law’, in: 71 Law & Contemp. 
Probs. 73, 77-87; for application to choice of law in torts, R. MICHAELS, ‘Two Economists 
Three Opinions? Economic Models for Private International Law – Cross-Border Torts as 
Example’, in: J. BASEDOW & T. KONO (eds.), An Economic Analysis of Private International 
Law (2006) 143. 
71 E. O’HARA & L. E. RIBSTEIN, ‘From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law’, in: 
67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1151 (2000); see also M. J. WHINCOP & M. KEYES, Policy and Pragma-
tism in the Conflict of Laws (2001) (a book by two Australian scholars but with impact in 
the United States). 
72 E. O’HARA & L. E. RIBSTEIN, The Law Market (2009).  
73 J. TRACHTMAN, The Economic Structure of International Law (2008). 
74 See, e.g., M. J. WHINCOP & M. KEYES (note 71); E. O’HARA & L.E. RIBSTEIN (note 
71); J. P. TRACHTMAN, ‘Economic Analysis of Prescriptive Jurisdiction’, in: 42 Va. J. Int’l 
L. 1 (2001); J. P. TRACHTMAN, ‘Conflict of Laws and Accuracy in the Allocation of Govern-
ment Responsibility’, in: 26 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 975 (1994). 
75 R. MICHAELS (note 70), at 94-101; see also K. ROOSEVELT, Conflict of Laws 
(2010) 39-41. 
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though it is unlikely they will lead to fundamentally new approaches or even 
theories. The third model provides considerations that are altogether absent from 
traditional conflict of laws thinking and that may prove fruitful ideas. 
 
 
B.  Political Science 
Economics is not the only social science with a newly found interest in conflict of 
laws; another is political science. For a long time, that was not the case. Lea Bril-
mayer argued earlier that the application of foreign law had to be justified in 
considerations of rights and fairness, and that the application of a certain law to a 
person had to be justified on political grounds,76 but she has moved her scholarly 
interest to other areas. Anne-Marie Slaughter’s earlier work on international law 
and international relations incorporated conflict of laws because it has a place for 
private actors and thus for private international law;77 but conflict of laws no longer 
plays a role in her recent work.78 Most political theory still ignores conflict of laws; 
even analyses in international relations that address prescriptive jurisdiction and 
sovereignty rarely deal with matters of conflict of laws. However, this may be 
changing. Political science analyses draw attention to the connection between 
private international law and global governance in a way that is largely ignored by 
insider experts. At the same time, political science and political theory may 
(re)insert a political perspective into a discipline that has long been defined by 
technicalities. These, ironically, are based on concepts like governmental interests 
that once carried enormous political significance. 
To begin with empirics, one fashionable topic in political science in the 
United States is the determination of factors that impact judicial decisions. Political 
scientists are often skeptical that legal doctrine has any role to play, let alone a 
decisive one, in how judges rule on cases. Earlier empirical studies came to the 
same conclusion for choice of law and thereby fed into the general criticism of 
conflict of laws as a field with too many methodological approaches that ultimately 
leave too much discretion to judges to decide cases as they see fit.79 By contrast, a 
recent analysis by Chris Whytock on choice of law in international transactions, 
                                                          
76 An exception is L. BRILMAYER, ‘Rights, Fairness and Choice of Law’, in: 98 Yale 
L.J. 1277 (1989).  
77 E.g. A.-M. SLAUGHTER, ‘Liberal International Relations Theory and International 
Economic Law’, in: 10 Am. U. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 717 (1995) 730 (‘The choice of law gov-
erning individuals and groups in transnational society is an important factor shaping the 
predictability and facility of transnational social relations.’) 
78 A.-M. SLAUGHTER, A New World Order (2004). 
79 M. E. SOLIMINE, ‘An Economic and Empirical Analysis of Choice of Law’, in: 24 
Ga. L. Rev. 49 (1989); P. J. BORCHERS, ‘The Choice-of-Law Revolution: An Empirical 
Study’, in: 49 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 357 (1992); S. E. THIEL, ‘Choice of Law and the Home-
Court Advantage: Evidence’, in: 2 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 291 (2000), 305; see also S.C. 
SYMEONIDES (note 10), and the critique by H. Y. LEVIN, ‘What Do We Really Know About 
the American Choice-of-Law Revolution?’, in: 60 Stan. L. Rev. 247 (2007). 
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using more sophisticated regression analysis than some earlier studies, reaches the 
result that methods do have an impact on the outcome of cases.80 This result is 
relevant for conflict of laws not only because it suggests that conflict of laws 
doctrine is practically relevant; more importantly, it reenters conflict of laws 
among the disciplines relevant for global governance, a point that Whytock makes 
elsewhere, too.81 
 
 
C.  Legal Pluralism 
A third interdisciplinary approach to conflict of laws integrates insights from legal 
pluralism, a concept previously formulated mainly within anthropology.82 Paul 
Schiff Berman has drawn on ideas of legal pluralism to argue for an approach to 
conflict of laws that is both cosmopolitan (and thus more open than current 
approaches to foreign claims to regulation) and pluralist (and thus open to the des-
ignation of non-state normative orders as applicable law).83 The cosmopolitan 
component of this suggestion sounds not revolutionary for the European tradition, 
but it is certainly welcome in the United States.84 The pluralist suggestion that non-
state law should be applied under a choice-of-law analysis, by contrast, might have 
the potential to reinvigorate the methodological debates because some traditional 
factors – governmental interests, territorial connections – are unavailable for com-
munities that have neither governments nor territories.85  
While this amounts largely to a one-way translation from pluralism to 
private international laws, other scholars focus more on a mutual interaction 
between both fields. Robert Wai, writing in the international business context, 
lauds accounts of global legal pluralism for their analyses of the growth of multiple 
normative orders and their recognition of inter-legality, meaning the 
superimposition, interpenetration, and mixture of different legal spaces in both 
                                                          
80 C. A. WHYTOCK, ‘Myth of Mess? International Choice of Law in Action’, in: 84 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. (2009) 719. 
81 C. A. WHYTOCK, ‘Domestic Courts and Global Governance’, in: 84 Tulane Law 
Review (forthcoming 2009). See also T. PUTNAM, ‘Courts Without Borders: Domestic 
Sources of U.S. Extraterritoriality in the Regulatory Sphere’, in: 63 International Organiza-
tion 459-490 (2009). 
82 See also R. MICHAELS, ‘Global Legal Pluralism’, in: 5 Annual Review of Law 243 
(2009). 
83 See P. S. BERMAN, ‘Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws: Redefin-
ing Governmental Interests in a Global Era’, in: 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1819 (2005); P. S. 
BERMAN, ‘The New Legal Pluralism’, in: 5 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 225 
(2009), 234-36. 
84 See N. HATZIMIHAIL, ‘On Mapping the Conceptual Battlefield of Private Interna-
tional Law’, in: 13 Hague Y.B. Int’l L. 57 (2000). 
85 R. MICHAELS, ‘The Re-State-ment of Non-State Law, The State, Choice of Law, 
and the Challenge from Global Legal Pluralism’, in: 51 Wayne L. Rev. 1209 (2005). 
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mind and action.86 However, he argues that while these accounts serve as an 
important corrective to a doctrinal focus on state norms, they overemphasize non-
state normative orders, for example, insisting on a purely non-state lex mercatoria 
unrecognizable to legal practitioners. For Wai, they also miss the full extent of 
their own conception of inter-legality. He proposes instead ‘transnational private 
law’ as a frame of reference that adds private international law to private law, 
thereby reminding us of private law’s concern with relationships among plural and 
transnational normative orders, both state and non-state. 
As a last example, Annelise Riles shows how contemporary anthropological 
insights into the character of cultural difference and cultural fragmentation can 
reframe conflict-of-laws analysis in productive ways.87 Taking up the example of 
the treatment of Native American sovereignty in U.S. courts, she argues that a 
theory of conflict of laws as a discipline devoted to addressing the problem of 
cultural conflict is more doctrinally illuminating than the mainstream view of 
conflict of laws as political conflict. Rethinking these cultural conflicts, examining 
them through the prism of recent anthropological insights about culture as a 
problem of empathetic description and collaborative engagement with others, both 
reveals the importance of conflicts as a field and draws attention to aspects of the 
field’s methodology, such as the description of foreign law, that are given too little 
attention in mainstream analyses.  
 
 
D.  The Return of Theory 
The benefits of different interdisciplinary approaches to conflict of laws can be 
shown in the example discussed previously, namely same-sex marriage. Writing in 
the social sciences, particularly law and economics, can simplify and bring more 
order to the discussion. Thus, from a law-and-economics perspective, the proposal 
has been made that the law of the place of celebration should determine all effects 
as between the parties, but that states remain free to define the third-party effect of 
marriages celebrated elsewhere.88 Law-and-economics authors freely admit that 
this is more a perspective than a solution, leaving specific questions open.89 By 
contrast, writings from the humanities and critical theory help add necessary 
complexity, by demonstrating the social meaning of legal recognition. For 
example, Brenda Cossman demonstrates how recognition of same-sex marriage 
takes place not only through court decisions but also, more publicly, in 
announcements in the New York Times. She also shows how the invocation of 
                                                          
86 R. WAI, ‘The Interlegality of Transnational Private Law’, in: 71/3 Law & 
Contemp. Probs. 107 (Summer 2008). 
87 A. RILES, ‘Cultural Conflicts’, in: 71/3 Law & Contemp. Probs. 273 (Summer 
2008). 
88 F. BUCKLEY & L. E. RIBSTEIN, ‘Calling a Truce in the Marriage Wars’, in: U. Ill. L. 
Rev. 561 (2001). 
89 E. O’HARA & L.E. RIBSTEIN (n. 72) at 165-66. 
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public policy against same-sex marriage celebrated elsewhere paradoxically 
reinforces the existence of gay and lesbian marriage as a political problem, and 
recognizes the validity of a same-sex marriage, even if celebrated elsewhere.90 In 
this sense, the very proceedings in which courts decide whether to recognize a 
same-sex marriage celebrated elsewhere is already an act of recognition insofar as 
the proceedings must recognize publicly, for purposes of the proceedings, the 
existence of this very marriage, even if they ultimately deny legal recognition. We 
see a similar occurrence in the Texan decision reported above: if a marriage 
celebrated in Massachusetts is recognized for the purpose of allowing divorce, its 
effect is paradoxical: the marriage in question is at the same time recognized as 
valid and destroyed through the divorce.91 This kind of paradoxical (and fruitful) 
engagement with the issues of same-sex marriage would be hard to conceive in 
domestic law, yet it also requires theoretical analysis to become visible. 
We see, thus, two promises of the new interdisciplinarity in conflict of laws. 
One use of interdisciplinarity currently in vogue seeks to directly translate insights 
from other disciplines into substantive legal rules. Even though the rules that result 
from such translations often merely resemble what already existed before the doc-
trine, the interdisciplinary lens provides an additional perspective on what exists. 
Unfortunately, interdisciplinary suggestions for legal rules rarely achieve the 
complexity and specificity needed for adequate legal solutions; this is nowhere 
more true than in conflict of laws. This seems to be true especially for the United 
States: recent economic analysis of choice of law pursued by European and 
Japanese scholars is more closely tied to doctrine.92 But the return to simple models 
may be beneficial for a discipline mired in complexities. 
Another use of interdisciplinarity can be both to highlight the specific sen-
sitivities and rationalities existing within conflict of laws and to develop a new, 
richer and more theoretical, view of the field. Thus, political-science analyses draw 
attention to the connection between private international law and global govern-
ance in a way that is largely ignored by insider experts. The insights of legal plu-
                                                          
90 B. COSSMAN, ‘Betwixt and Between Recognition: Migrating Same-Sex Marriages 
and the Turn Toward the Private’, in 71/3 Law & Contemp. Probs. 153-68 (Summer 2008). 
91 The flipside is true as well: non-recognition of the marriage means divorce is 
impossible, so the marriage survives. D. JOHNSON, ‘Same-Sex Divorce Jurisdiction: A 
Critical Analysis of Chambers v. Ormiston and Why Divorce is an Incident of Marriage 
That Should Be Uniformly Recognized Throughout the States’, in: 50 Santa Clara L. Rev. 
225 (2009). 
92 An Economic Analysis of Private International Law (J. BASEDOW & T. KONO eds., 
2006); G. RÜHL, ‘Party Autonomy in the Private International Law of Contracts: Transat-
lantic Convergence and Economic Efficiency’, in: Essays In Memory of A.T. von Mehren 
(2007); G. RÜHL, ‘Methods and Approaches in Choice of Law: An Economic Perspective’, 
in: 24 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 801 (2006); H. MUIR WATT, ‘Choice of Law in Integrated and 
Interconnected Markets: A Matter of Political Economy’, in: 9 Colum. J. Eur. L. 383 (2003); 
H. MUIR WATT, ‘Aspects économiques du droit international privé’, in: 25 Rec. des cours 
307 (2004). 
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ralism can help develop an understanding of the sensitivities necessary to deal with 
the global legal pluralism that characterizes the situation of law in today’s world. 
 
 
 
IV.  Conclusion: Ready for a New Restatement? 
What does all of this mean for a new Restatement? A Restatement would have to 
consist of some type of rules, and this presents a problem in a discipline that has, at 
least in the United States, become deeply suspicious of rules. Admittedly, the 
emphasis on politics has not prevented a certain return to legal rules in choice of 
law.93 Courts in New York attempted to formulate their approach to determining 
the law applicable for guest statute conflicts (and later loss-allocating rules more 
generally) in what has become known as the Neumeier rules, but these rules have 
not gained many fans.94 Choice of law has since been codified, arguably with more 
success, in Louisiana95 and Oregon – first for contracts,96 then generally.97 This is 
sometimes viewed with relief – at last, as basis for judicial decisions – but often 
with suspicion. Opposition to technique is deeply engrained in U.S. post-realist 
legal thinking; technique and rules are viewed as standing in opposition to politics 
and theory. For example, Gary Simson, himself a highly regarded scholar of 
conflict of laws, has suggested that the interstate and conflict-of-laws discussion 
distracts from the real issue, which is not whether states can or cannot recognize 
marriages celebrated elsewhere but if they have the right to refuse same-sex 
marriage under their own law.98 This would suggest that truly political questions 
                                                          
93 J. KROPHOLLER & J. VON HEIN, ‘From Approach to Rule-Orientation in American 
Tort Conflicts, in Law and Justice in a Multistate World’, in: Essays in Honor of A.T. von 
Mehren (2002), 317. 
94 For discussion, see S.C. SYMEONIDES, (note 10), at 105-14; for criticism, see, e.g., 
G. SIMSON, ‘The Neumeier-Schultz Rules: How Logical a «Next Stage in the Evolution of 
the Law» after Babcock?’, in: 56 Alb. L. Rev. 913 (1993). 
95 Book IV of the Louisiana Civil Code, La. Civ. Code Ann. arts. 3515-3549; see P. 
BORCHERS, ‘Louisiana’s Conflicts Codification: Some Empirical Observations Regarding 
Decisional Predictability’, in: 60 La. L. Rev. 1061 (2000); S. C. SYMEONIDES, ‘The Conflicts 
Book of the Louisiana Civil Code: Civilian, American, or Original?’, in: 83 Tul. L. Rev. 
1041 (2009). 
96 J.A.R. NAFZIGER, ‘Oregon’s Conflicts Law Applicable to Contracts’, in: 3 Yb . Pr. 
Int. L. (2001), 391 (republished in 38 Willamette L. Rev. 397 (2002)); S. C. SYMEONIDES, 
‘Codifying Choice of Law for Contracts: The Oregon Experience’, in: 67 RabelsZ 726 
(2003); S. C. SYMEONIDES, ‘Oregon’s Choice-of-Law Codification for Contract Conflicts: 
An Exegesis’, in: 44 Willamette L. Rev. 205-52 (2007). 
97 Chapter 451, 2009 Laws (signed into law June 23, 2009; effective January 1, 
2010). 
98 G. J. SIMSON, ‘Beyond Interstate Recognition in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate’, 
in: 40 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 313 (2006). 
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are matters for substantive law and for the constitution, but not for the technicali-
ties of conflict of laws. And indeed, the heritage from legal realism seems to sug-
gest an insurmountable difference between politics and theory on the one hand, 
doctrine on the other. 
Symeonides has suggested that one way to deal with this problem is to for-
mulate a technique that faces no opposition from politics or theory because it mir-
rors their outcome. He suggests using empirical surveys of outcomes to conflict-of-
laws cases99 as the basis for the formulation of new and better rules.100 He has 
applied this approach for rather general rules on issues of loss-distribution101 and 
conduct regulation102 as well as cross-border torts103 and, more specifically, for 
product liability.104 Now, he suggests using the experiences gained in the process as 
a basis for a third Restatement of Conflict of Laws, though one limited to the law 
of obligations.105 
The return to rules and thus an openly technical approach to choice of law 
may serve as a welcome antidote to the exaggeratedly open-ended approaches 
favored in the conflicts revolution. The revolution in the United States was directed 
against, and thus spurred by, the particular choice-of-law rules formulated in the 
First Restatement,106 leaving open the possibility that better rules than the ones 
formulated in the First Restatement are possible.107 Nonetheless, the fundamental 
opposition to rules may stymie the development of new, better rules as well. The 
attempt to ground new rules on surveys of case outcomes, with little attention to 
either doctrine or theory, may be insufficient. The conflict of laws revolution 
combined its antiformalism with the rise of politics and theory, but this need not 
mean that those categories are incompatible. The new developments discussed 
above may be able to provide substance for projects towards a new Restatement. 
At the very least, they may help make the field at large interesting enough for a 
new Restatement to attract the necessary support.  
 
                                                          
99 See above pp. 25-26. 
100 S.C. SYMEONIDES (note 10), at 433-37; see the favorable review by W. M. 
RICHMAN, ‘A New Breed of Smart Empirically Derived Conflicts Rules: Better Law than 
«Better Law» in the Post-Tort Reform Era: Reviewing Symeon C. Symeonides, ‘The 
American Choice-of-Law Revolution: Past, Present and Future (2006)’, in: 82 Tul. L. Rev. 
2181 (2008). 
101 S.C. SYMEONIDES (note 10), at 207-8. 
102 Ibid. at 259-60. 
103 Even three different options: S. C. SYMEONIDES, ‘Choice of Law in Cross-Border 
Torts: Why Plaintiffs Win, and Should’, in: 61 Hastings L. J. 337 (2009), 404-411.  
104 S.C. SYMEONIDES (note 10), 346. 
105 S.C. SYMEONIDES (note 10), 20. 
106 For this point, see R. MICHAELS (note 17), at 1611. 
107 S.C. SYMEONIDES (note 10), at 428-29. 
